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Abstract 
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea(North Korea) has been one of the most 
repressive regimes in the world. The international community, including the United Nations, 
several States including the United States and the Republic of Korea(South Korea), and non-
governmental organizations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have 
criticized and accused North Korea of numerous human rights violations. This paper seeks to 
explore whether there has been any impact of those criticisms on North Korea either at the 
macro-level (laws and policies) or micro-level (common people's lives on the ground). The paper 
will discuss how international human rights laws, the international community, and global trends 
have impacted North Korea by looking into three aspects of North Korea's political culture: its 
legal reforms, changes in policies and diplomatic actions, and the overall quality of people's lives. 
The first two will be considered at the macro-level, and the third aspect at the micro-level. The 
impacts of international human rights laws and international community on North Korea  will be 
measured based on Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink's "Spiral Model," which involves five phases of 
human rights compliance by States from "repression" to "rule-consistent behavior." 
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On 17 September, 2013, there was an article in The New York Times reporting on the 
actions of  the United Nations to compel the international community to take action on North 
Korea's(Democratic People's Republic of Korea) human rights situation (Cumming-Bruce). 
There is a "pattern of abuse" on a huge scale in North Korea, which was shown by many reports 
and widespread evidence from North Korean refugees and other organizations about horrific 
human rights violations in North Korea in the last decades (Cumming-Bruce). However, most of 
the world powers have paid attention only to the nuclear issue when it comes to North Korea 
(Cumming-Bruce). Therefore, the Human Rights Council in the United Nations is reportedly 
trying to focus more attention on its human rights situation by pursuing more investigations 
(Cumming-Bruce). Despite these actions, it is not known whether the critiques and accusation 
from the international community or international human rights laws have had any impact on 
North Korea's human rights situation. It is crucial to know how international human rights laws 
and the current actions by the international community have had any effects in order to generate 
better strategies to lead the State to improve its human rights practices. Thus, this paper is going 
to discuss the research question: "how have international human rights laws, accusations from 
international community, and global trends impacted the human rights situation in North Korea?" 
This paper will argue based on the author's research that there are impacts of international human 
rights laws, accusations from international community, and global trends in that North Korea is 
actually responding to them at least at the macro level of the State with legal reforms, political 
actions, and diplomatic actions of signing treaties. When it comes to timeline, this paper will 
focus on the regimes of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, before current Kim Jong-un regime. In 
addition, in terms of spiral model from Risse, Ropp, Sikkink's The Persistent Power of Human 
Rights: From Commitment to Compliance , which depicts how human-rights-violating countries 
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come to follow human rights norms, North Korea is currently covering three phases at the same 
time: "repression", "denial", and "tactical concession."   
For the rest of this paper, the paper will largely focus on three main areas: 1) reform of 
the North Korean legal system; 2) the response of the government to the international community, 
primarily the United Nations, individual countries, and international Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), in creating its policies and signing international human rights treaties; 
and 3) the overall quality of people's lives in the State, which will be measured in this paper 
through the aspects of nutrition and health, the right to a secure life, and the right to gain 
knowledge and education. The first two areas will be macro level measurements of State action, 
and the third area, the quality of people's lives, will be measured at the  micro level of the State. 
Specifically, the paper is going to look at whether any changes in macro level are affecting the 
micro level of people's lives. 
Human Rights Framework 
Human rights have been mentioned or considered in official documents since the ancient 
laws like the Code of Hammurabi (Weissbrodt et al.). Especially, after World War II, the modern 
human rights movement spread across the world, mainly through the United Nations (Weissbrodt 
et al.). The UN Charter and several multilateral treaties were created to address human rights 
issues around the world together, especially with a legal mechanism (Weissbrodt et al.). 
Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was written by a drafting 
committee consisting of delegates from several countries representing all geographic regions of 
the work; its purpose was to complete and strengthen the UN Charter, as a guide-line for human 
rights protection. According to Article 1 of the UDHR, "All human beings are born free and 
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equal in dignity and rights." Human Rights are regarded by the international community as the 
most fundamental and basic rights that every person. The rights include "right to life, liberty, and 
personal security" and "freedom from torture and degrading treatment" according to the UDHR. 
Even though the UDHR is a declaration, it is considered by many to be legally binding like other 
human rights treaties, because the UDHR's provisions are further elaborated in the two core 
human rights covenants, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights(ICESCR),  both of which 
North Korea is bound to follow, as a State party. Furthermore, the UDHR has been accepted as 
the authoritative definition of "human rights," as provided in the UN Charter, which is legally 
binding. The provisions of the UDHR apply to all States that have joined the United Nations by 
becoming States Parties to the UN Charter,  including North Korea. Beside the UDHR, there are 
many other legal mechanisms or laws in the UN, including the two covenants, the ICESCR and 
the ICCPR, and seven conventions related to human rights (OHCHR). These international human 
rights laws help protect human rights in that the treaty committee periodically reviews the human 
rights situation of the States which ratified the respective treaties, so-called State Parties, and the 
State Parties are obliged to be consistent to the laws for their domestic administration and 
treatment of their people (UN). If they are violating the laws, they are pressured from 
international community, especially with international mechanisms within the UN, to fulfill their 
obligations under various treaties (UN).   
 Despite this legal framework, there are several States that have continuously violated 
human rights over decades, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The 
mechanisms described above are used by human rights advocates to keep pressuring the States to 
comply with international human rights laws and standards. When the States are held 
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accountable for their violation of human rights by international NGOs, UN, and other States, 
they tend to go through the "spiral model" (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink). The "spiral model" is a 
theoretical explanation of how the process of compliance works.
1
  It describes the procedure of 
"human rights socialization" for human rights violators (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 9). There are 
five phases that describe these States' response to being accused of their human rights violations 
by the international community (NGOs ,UN, and other States) : "repression," "denial," "tactical 
concessions," "prescriptive status," and "rule-consistent behavior" (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 6). 
For the first stage, a country is in a phase of repression under leaders using dramatic acts of 
social control, resulting in a society that is not free enough for its people to have different ideas 
from the leaders' ideas (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 6). Then, when the State receives criticisms or 
accusations about the violation of human rights from transnational networks including both 
NGOs and inter-government organizations, it denies the violations and does not accept the 
criticism from the international community, rejecting the authority of the international 
community to criticize the State (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 6; 8). However, the international 
community, primarily the UN, NGOs, and other States, continues criticizing the State's human 
rights violations, and tries to hold it accountable for the violations with a lot of evidence and 
information on the situation and legal mechanisms. Being pressured by the international 
community constantly, the State changes its response to the criticisms to "tactical concession". In 
this stage, the State tries to appear as if they were following the norm of the international human 
rights community so as not to get criticized from the international community. For example, they 
may loosen the restriction they have on political opposition within the State, or sign some 
                                                          
1
 The author admits that the "spiral model" is just one of theories to describe how states come to comply with 
human rights norms, and there are some critiques of it such as the claim that it seems one directional while reality 
doesn't always work that way. However, since the model has been accepted widely in social science field as one of 
popular theories, this paper is going to be based on it.   
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international treaties to get away from the attention of the international community(Risse, Ropp, 
and Sikkink 6). In the fourth stage, which is called "prescriptive status", the State shows more 
sincere and positive response to the international community, establishing human rights 
mechanisms both internationally and domestically. For example, the State ratifies some 
international human rights treaties (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 7). Ratifying a treaty is different 
from signing it in that the former one can make a State bound by the treaty, while the latter one 
cannot. Also, in this stage, the State government establishes human rights laws or mechanisms 
within the State by changing its laws and building national human rights institutions that create 
and enforce domestic human rights protection, and actually refers to them for creating its politics 
(Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 7). For the final stage, the State's action becomes rule-consistent with 
international human rights laws, and the local human rights community and international human 
rights community work together to bring about change in the State's situation (Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink 7). Based on this model, different cases of the human rights violating countries are 
examined for more effective human rights protection. In this context, the paper will use this 
model to apply it to the North Korean human rights situation.  
 Background Information about North Korea 
 Before analyzing the international legal mechanisms or actions toward North Korean 
human rights situation, this paper will give more background information about North Korea's 
human rights record. Since 1948, when North Korea was formed as an official State, also known 
as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the country has been governed by the 
dictatorship of the Kim family. The demography of the State has been described and detailed by 
two censuses conducted in 1993 and 2008 (DPRK National Report 1). Especially, the 2008 
census was intended not only for an accurate count of the population but also for understanding 
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the "social and economic characteristics" of the people in order to create policies for "social and 
economic development" (DPRK National Report 1). The gender ratio for the age group from 0 to 
40 years is around 104, which means that there are more men than women, but it reverses after 
40 years old (DPRK National Report 14; 15). Specifically, when it comes to North Korean 
babies, there has been abortion or infanticide. According to World Factbook quoted in Dr. Kirk 
Allision's Presentation on North Korean human rights situation, "the infant mortality rate" is 
25.34/1000 in North Korea, while the rate is 4.01/1000 in South Korea. In addition, when it 
comes to geographic distribution, most people are living in South Phyongan, which is more rural 
and poor, compared to Pyongyang, the capital that receives the most funds among the provinces 
in the DPRK (DPRK National Report 25; 26).  
 In this background, numerous human rights violations occurred under this regime. The 
State not only established its dictatorship through its legal systems but also has been controlling 
people's lives on the ground in several aspects.  
 First, when it comes to the legal system, the North Korean Constitution is just a 
manifestation of its political system rather than a guarantee of "justice for the people" (Yoon 
1291). Even though people's basic human rights, including freedom of speech and protection 
from arbitrary arrest, are technically written in the Constitution, it is very doubtful that they are 
protected in reality (Yoon 1294). The Korean Workers' Party is superior to any government 
organizations, under the dictatorship of the Kim family (Yoon 1290). Specifically, the 
Constitution says, "The DPRK shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the Workers' 
Party." (qtd. in Yoon 1290; 1291). It shows that the Constitution gives power directly to the party, 
rather than its own people. There is no institutional mechanism, established through the 
Constitution, for the North Korean people to claim rights violations. Instead, one of the main 
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things that the Constitution defines is the power structure of government organizations, and it is 
focused on centralizing power (Yoon). For example, in 1948, the Supreme People's Assembly 
(SPA) became "the highest organ of State authority" and it had "exclusive legislative 
power"(Yoon 1292; 1293). This situation shows that there are no other institutions that can point 
out human rights violations by the SPA, for the justice of the people, with its own authority.   
 Beyond controlling political opinions or public activities, one of the notable 
characteristics of the total control held by the North Korean government is that it even seeks to 
control personal basic emotions. When it comes to people's lives, the State even controls people's 
freedom to love (Demick). For example, the North Korean environment is so strict and 
conservative that a film implying that a couple kissed, even though it didn't show their lips touch, 
was given an R rating (Demick 15). In this environment, the people are discouraged to show love 
or affection to each other in public under social pressure (Demick 80). Many marriages in North 
Korea are arranged by families or party secretaries, and there is no dating culture (Demick 80).  
Compared to other countries like the U.S., S. Korea, and even China, where the freedom to love 
seems natural as one of human's basic emotion, these examples shows how strictly the basic 
emotion is controlled in North Korean society. It is also implied that the state controls social 
environment to see free-dating as unnatural, so it should be not done openly (Demick). This 
situation suggests that the North Korean government is trying to control even private lives of 
people, by indirectly and directly influencing them through the media which includes films and 
education systems. 
In addition, the State controls its people’s financial situation in that it controls their work 
through which they make a living with food coupons. Most North Koreans cannot stop working 
or even complain about the works despite terrible working condition with little pay because the 
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work is directly related to their food and survival (Demick 60). Otherwise, they might be "sent to 
a detention center" (Demick 60). At the same time, however, North Korean leaders are 
inconsistent about their rules. There is widespread corruption from supervisors by overlooking 
the situation "with a wink and a nod" when some other people  miss their work (Demick 60). It 
shows that the controlling system is inconsistent because some leaders loosen the control for 
certain people, while trying to control other people’s lives including working schedule. 
Furthermore, even North Koreans’ minds and thoughts are controlled from their 
childhood. For example, North Korean children are well aware of the song “We Have Nothing to 
Envy in the World” even to the point where they memorized the lyrics of the song (Demick 119). 
The song is about praising the “Godly” leader, Kim Il-sung, and this song might make the 
children view the countries outside their country as inferior ones to their country, or scary ones 
that might attack them. Moreover, all kinds of education, even for science, in North Korea are 
supposed to be based on the ideology of a society (Demick 120). They are all ultimately used to 
praise the leader, Kim Il-sung, and to make students antagonistic to “enemy” States including the 
U.S. and Japan (Demick 120). In this system, many North Koreans are brainwashed and their 
minds are controlled by their leaders, from a young age. For example, Hyeonseo Lee, who is 
from North Korea, now living in South Korea, said in her Ted Talk presentation that she had 
thought North Korea was the best state in the world, "singing a song 'Nothing to Envy'" while 
she grew up in North Korea. In that way, the State keeps controlling its people’s minds and 
thoughts across generations.     
Along with these controls from the government, North Koreans’ human rights, especially 
the “right to life” (Article 3 of the UDHR)  and the “right to a standard of living…including food” 
(Article 25), are violated from the failure of its economic system. From many news and scholarly 
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articles, including Kotona-Apte, Judit and Ali Mokdad’s “Malnutrition of Children in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea,” it is clear that North Korean society is known to 
be one of the poorest countries in the world to the extent that people are starving to death almost 
every day. This shows that its economic system is clearly not working well. Even though it is 
clearly shown that the system needs to be changed, its leaders maintain the general structure of 
the system, especially the system of “central control,” because it is related to keeping their power 
(Hassig and Oh 65; 66). Meanwhile, most of North Korea's common people do not even know 
about principles of their economic system and the statistics for their economic situation while 
they are struggling for survival in this system (Hassig and Oh 65). The economic system, which 
is based on communism, is supposed to distribute resources equally, but North Korea seems to 
only focus on central control rather than distribution. According to Hassig and Oh, the “central 
control” is a fascinating tool for dictators in that the leaders not only monopolize means of 
production  but also use it politically to protect their power by punishing those who don’t follow 
them well (66).  
As a whole, from a statistical point of view, the Gross National Income(GNI) of North 
Korea was approximately $25.6 billion in 2006, which is thirty-five times less than its 
neighboring country, South Korea (67). Furthermore, North Korean per capita GNI in 2006 was 
$1,108, which is 17 times less than that of South Korea (67). This situation shows that North 
Koreans are in more severe poverty, compared to the situation in neighboring States. Especially, 
considering the fact that North Korea and South Korea have similar natural resources, given their 
status as two divided States on a peninsula, the economic difference between the States shows 
that North Korea's economic system is not working well to support its people financially. 
However,  due to the government leaders' inability to take care of its people and the economy, 
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most North Koreans have not been able to get out of the poverty cycle, resulting in their basic 
human rights being denied. For example, the State doesn't properly operate Public Distribution 
System of food because of food shortage in economic difficulty in North Korea (KINU 311). The 
poor operation of the system worsens the poverty, which makes people stuck in the poverty cycle 
where people's rights to food and life are threatened.    
Overall, in North Korea, its leader, Kim, is the only one whose human rights are entirely 
protected (Hassig and Oh 195). The dictator continues staying in power because of the 
oppression and violation of the rest of North Koreans' human rights (Hassig and Oh 195). The 
government keeps violating the human rights of its people through its established political 
systems, and the people are "expected to support Kim enthusiastically" (Kagan, Oh and 
Weissbrodt ). The rights to food, the rights to safety, and the right to individual liberties, which 
are taken for granted in most countries including the U.S. and S. Korea, are severely violated by 
the leaders in North Korea. If the people attempt to eat, live, or travel freely, all of them are sent 
to prisons (Hassig and Oh 195). The politics and the laws in the society are entirely controlled by 
the political party, and used to  maintain the leaders' power and to justify their ruling over the 
State (Hassig and Oh 196). In particular, the law of North Korea is based upon "Ten-Point 
Principles", which are the party principles centered on Kim, Il-sung (Hassig and Oh 196). These 
principles look very similar to the Ten Commandments in the Bible, which means North Korea 
seems to be not "a State" for its people, but a religious group that worships its leaders, the Kim 
family. In this situation, even the right to be equally treated is violated by their leaders for 
common people, while the leaders are enjoying their privileges and abundant wealth, provided 
by the government. Specifically, the DPRK government classifies its people based on "their 
loyalty...to the Kim regime" (Hassig and Oh 198). Moreover, the names of the classes 
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themselves are discriminatory; "the core class, the wavering class" and the "hostile class". Most 
of the people from "the core class" are in positions of leadership, being "party cadres" (Hassig 
and Oh 198). These classes are mostly hereditary, based on family history, similar to a caste 
system (Hassig and Oh 199). There are some movements between classes, but only downward, 
based on whether one's  behavior and words reflect consistent "loyalty to the Kim regime" 
(Hassig and Oh 199). There seems to be no room to go up in this system with one's efforts alone 
in this context. 
Actions taken by International Community regarding Human Rights Violations in DPRK 
Considering this situation of severe human right violation in political, economic, and 
social areas, the international community has taken action for years to hold North Korea 
accountable. When it comes to the international community, this paper will focus on the United 
Nations, significant States that are closely related to the DPRK, including South Korea and the 
U.S
2
., as well as civil society
3
, primarily NGOs.  
First, the UN Human Rights Council has been investigating North Korea's human rights 
situation. The United Nations is at the forefront of demands for international action on the human 
rights violations perpetrated by North Korea (Cumming-Bruce). Through the Human Rights 
Council, the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) was founded on March 21, 2013 (OHCHR). The Commission was created after 
                                                          
2
 The author wants to acknowledge that there are countries other than S. Korea and the U.S., which are closely 
related to issues about North Korea, specifically  Japan, China, and Russia. For example, the six countries 
mentioned above have been holding Six Party talks on North Korean nuclear weapon issue from 2003 (Bajoria and 
Xu). However, for the purpose of this paper, two of the main state actors on North Korean human rights issue, S. 
Korea and the U.S. will be focused in the paper. 
3
 Civil Society includes not only NGOs but also media and religious groups "that manifest interests and will of 
citizens" (Dictionary.com). However, based on limited space for this paper, the paper will focus on NGOs for the 
actions done by civil society. 
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decades of discussions and attempt to address North Korean human rights issues, as a 
mechanism for high-level scrutiny of North Korean human rights situation (A/HRC/RES/22/13).  
The Commission consists of three individuals: Michael Donald Kirby from Australia, retired 
Judge, and Sonka Biserko from Serbia, "founder and president of Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights in Serbia", both of which are appointed by the President of Human Rights 
Council, and Marzuki Darusman from Indonesia, appointed to be Special Rapporteur
4
 on the 
situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by Human Rights 
Council in 2010, with Michael Kirby being the Chair of the Commission (OHCHR). Moreover, 
"nine experienced human rights officials" from the UN Secretariat helps the Commission for the 
investigations (OHCHR).  
The Commission has had several oral updates from the Chair and press releases about its 
investigation process, including getting testimonies from North Korean refugees (OHCHR).  For 
example, according to the Chair, previous prisoners of North Korea have reported that there have 
been numerous cruelties in prisons, including making a mother drown her baby and burning the 
corpses whose reason for the death is starvation (Cumming-Bruce). The panel of the 
Commission also sent a letter to North Korea's leader to get cooperation for the investigation, 
according to the chairman, but the letter was rejected by the North Korean government 
(Cumming-Bruce). However, the investigation led by the Commission of Inquiry is significant in 
that the United Nation gained a systematic tool to keep pressure on the North Korean 
government to improve their human rights situation. Furthermore, the UN has kept appealing to 
the international community to send food-aid to North Korea to help prevent North Koreans' 
human rights situation from becoming worse (Lee, S 77).   
                                                          
4
 The Special Rapporteur takes further investigations about the country's human rights situation, and writes annual 
reports on it both for Human Rights Council and General Assembly (OHCHR).   
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In addition to the work of the newly formed Commission, the Special Rapporteur has 
previously investigated the North Korean human rights situation by visiting countries near North 
Korea as well as cooperating with other members in the UN to get suggestions on the research 
process or have more manpower during the investigation process. The Special Rapporteur 
published several statements and documents based on his visits to different countries and 
research, and made recommendations for the international community with regard to the North 
Korean human rights issue. Specifically, the documents enumerate delineation of the rights that 
are being violated under North Korean regime and the actions that are taken by the General 
Assembly, Secretary General, and the Special Rapporteur in the UN, to condemn the violations. 
Since 2004, the Secretary General and Special Rapporteur have published twenty-two reports on 
the North Korean human rights situation and there have also been sixteen resolutions adopted by 
the "General Assembly and its subsidiary organs" on the situation (A/HRC/22/57 1). 
Furthermore, there are several mechanisms that have been used simultaneously to interact 
directly with and pressure North Korea to improve its human rights situation. These mechanisms 
include the Universal Periodic Review in which Human Rights Council reviews the human rights 
record  of each member State in the UN. UN human rights treaties bodies also assess the extent 
to which the country is conforming to the treaties it has ratified. For example, North Korea 
recently submitted reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2009, to the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2005, to the Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights in 2003, and to the Committee on Human Rights Committee in 2001 
(OHCHR). In addition to these mechanisms, the Special Rapporteur plays a crucial role in the 
investigation on the North Korean human rights situation because he has an authority to visit the 
State.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
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Secondly, while the UN has been doing all of these activities, the United States of 
America has also been playing a significant role in the protection of North Koreans' human rights. 
It adopted the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004. The Act provides funds during the 
period 2005 to 2008 in order to support North Korean refugees and to promote democracy in 
North Korea (Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, and Bruno 16). The Act also makes it easier for North 
Koreans to seek asylum in the U.S., and establishes "a Special Envoy [appointed by the President] 
to promote human rights in North Korea” (Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, and Bruno 17). 
Moreover, the Act emphasizes that  human rights should be central in any negotiations between 
the U.S. and North Korea and the U.S. should continue to give humanitarian aid to North Korea, 
along with improving monitoring mechanisms to make sure the resources that are donated are 
distributed well (Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, and Bruno 17). Reactions to this Act ranged from 
support to skepticism or criticism about the possibility that it might to harm U.S. relations with 
other countries like S.Korea and China (17). At the same time, the Act shows that the U.S. 
government is not just concerned about North Korea's human rights situation but also trying to 
take actions that might influence the situation more directly. The Act was renewed for four years 
after 2008 by the U.S. Congress. Based on this Act, the Special Envoy filed a report with the 
government on 8 Nov. 2012. The report describes the activities of the Special Envoy from March 
2011 to March 2012 to improve the human rights situation in North Korea (Bureau of East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs).  
Furthermore, the U.S. State Department publishes annual reports on the human rights 
situation in every country, including North Korea. For example, the North Korean report for 
2011 analyzes the human rights situation since Kim Jong-un took over the leadership after the 
death of his father, Kim Jong-il (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor). The report 
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largely describes violations of freedom of speech and the right to secure life, noting that arbitrary 
detention and extrajudicial killings continued to be committed in 2011 (Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor). The report is very comprehensive, explaining the specific and 
systematic violations of each right, perpetrated by the State. 
In addition to the U.S.'s actions, South Korea has published annual reports about the 
North Korea's human rights situation since 1991, especially through the Korea Institute for 
National Unification (KINU). KINU is a government-funded agency and "a national policy 
research institute... on North Korea and unification" (KINU.or.kr). For example, the "White 
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea" in 2013, published by KINU, discusses international 
human rights standards, North Korean laws on human rights, and the specific rights that are 
being violated in North Korea. The investigation for the annual reports has included personal 
interviews of North Korean defectors, analyses of North Korean laws and different articles on its 
human rights situation, including newspapers, South Korean government documents, and U.N. 
Documents. These reports are used by other human rights advocates as well. For example, the 
U.S. State Department cites them in its reports on North Korea. 
These reports are one of the main sources of information for the South Korean 
government and the general public to learn about the human rights situation in North Korea. 
South Korea cannot take proactive actions toward North Korea, such as directly investigating its 
human rights violations, because it is still in a temporary ceasefire agreement (not a war 
termination agreement) with North Korea.  This means the two countries are still very sensitive 
towards each other. However, South Korea is still taking indirect actions to help promote 
awareness of the North Korean human rights situation by setting up its KINU database. Using 
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this database, other countries, the U.N Special Rapporteur, and NGOs can proceed to take further 
actions to protect North Koreans' human rights.  
Thirdly, many NGOs are also engaged in investigating and reporting on North Korea's  
human rights violations. For example, Amnesty International publishes annual reports on North 
Korea's human rights situation, which include background information about its regime, food 
crisis, rights being violated, and international actions to improve the situation (AMNESTY.org). 
The organization has an archive for the reports on their website to which the public has free 
access. Amnesty International not only provides information about the situation but also calls for 
direct actions from its members, such as an online petition to the North Korean leader. Recently, 
on May 4, 2011, Amnesty International sponsored a petition to call for closing political prison 
camps in North Korea, which was signed by 6,259 people. Using this mechanism, the 
organization keeps pressuring North Korea to improve its human rights situation with the support 
of people from all over the world.  
Human rights NGOs are not just working independently to investigate North Korean 
human rights issues but they are also cooperating with one another in the process of "naming and 
shaming" the government of North Korea and calling for international action for it to stop 
violating human rights. International and domestic NGOs, in general, play a crucial role in 
transnational advocacy networks, working together to carry out research and "pressuring more 
powerful actors to take positions" (Keck and Sikkink 9). Therefore, transnational advocacy 
networks try not only "to change the behavior of states" but also to bring more attention and 
encourage more action from other international human rights organizations (Keck and Sikkink 
2;3). For example, according to an article from Human Rights Watch, more than forty human 
rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, called for more 
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attention and action internationally to stop human rights violation in North Korea, on December 
8th, 2011.  This was two days before International Human Rights Day, which occurs on 
December 10
th
 and commemorates the establishment of UDHR and promotes human rights 
awareness. In general, NGOs have been gathering a lot of information about the North Korean 
human rights situation, gaining support from many people across the world, and pressuring 
North Korea to improve its human rights situation. 
Direct State Response to International Pressure 
This paper will now evaluate the impacts of these important interventions by international 
actors (the United Nations, significant countries, and NGOs) as well as international human 
rights laws on the North Korean human rights situation.  This paper will focus specifically on 
three main areas regarding these impacts: 1) legal reforms, 2) specific government reactions to 
international pressure and global trends (policy changes and diplomacy in response to 
international pressure), and 3) the overall quality of people's lives in North Korea. 
1) Legal Reform  
              A. Constitutional Reforms 
In regard to legal reforms, there have been some changes in North Korea’s Constitution 
to improve the representation of its people in the government and better serve them and some 
changes in the State’s criminal law to better define crime and reduce the degree of punishment. 
The North Korean Constitution defines the underlying principles of the State (Yoon 1289). This 
analysis will begin by reviewing the change in the Constitution as a way of understanding how 
the nature of the government has changed. This paper is going to show the main point of the 
Constitution when it was first established in 1948 and then talk about some reforms that have 
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been made in the Constitution. Furthermore, the paper will discuss the changes in North Korean 
criminal law because it is closely related to human rights protection in the State. 
When the North Korean Constitution was adopted in 1948, when the State was officially 
created, the main thing it focused on was the centralization of power. For the political power 
structure, it manifested that the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) is "the highest organ" (Yoon 
1292). Following the USSR's Supreme Soviet model, the SPA was established as a legislative 
body (Yoon 1292). For the members of the Assembly, there is technically an election with four  
principles for democratic and safe voting: "universal, equal, direct, and secret voting" (Yoon 
1293). However, in reality, the party approves candidates for election, after a strict screening 
process (Yoon 1293).  
This process reveals that elections are just a tool for justifying the selections of the 
political party in power. However, even this party does not have full power over the politics of 
the State, and it was heavily influenced by the leader, Kim Il-sung (Yoon 1293). The party was 
established to make North Korea look like it has "democratic representation" (Yoon 1293). The 
implementation of the Constitution shows that North Korea was obsessively focused on 
establishing and strengthening the centralization of power. At the same time, however, the very 
existence of the Constitution shows us that North Korea is concerned about the perceptions of 
international community; at least it looks like this superficially. This can be shown specifically in 
the part that the State established the SPA as "a quasi-independent agency" to make the State's 
politics appears to have "democratic representation" (Yoon 1293). It appears that the party rules 
the State and select its candidates independently with less influence from any power, possibly 
applying "check and balance" principle between the party and the leader of the State.  
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The State is, however, not democratic despite its claim to this status, as the official name 
of the State suggests. One measure of democracy is provided by the "Polity IV Project: Political 
Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012" which judges the degree of democracy in 
politics on factors including: "executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and 
political competition...  [and] changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority" 
(Marshall). Based on these measures by the indicators, Polity IV put States on the scale between 
-10 (autocracy) to 10 ("full democracy") (Marshall). Specifically, North Korea has been 
continuously rated an autocratic State, staying between -7 to -9 on the scale, from 1948 to 2010 
(Marshall). Furthermore, most North Koreans don't even know about their political systems very 
well as they are too busy struggling for their survival to think about them while they are 
oppressed from the government, according to stories of exiles
5
. Therefore, the establishment of 
the system, which looks like it is democratic, is not for its people. At the same time, however, if 
North Korea did not care about international community, it would not have bothered to create the 
appearance of democracy; thus, it seems that North Korea cares about how international 
community perceives the State, at least at the surface level of what the State looks like in its 
Constitution, and is susceptible to international approbation.     
There was a change of Constitution in 1972. Through this change, the State further 
empowered the dictatorship system, which is not good sign for the human rights situation. At the 
same time, however, the 1972 Constitution set forth a socialist vision or goal aimed to benefit the 
public. The 1972 reform, therefore, provides the international community with a measure to hold 
the State accountable.  
                                                          
5
 There are several documentaries and TV programs where North Korean refugees share their stories about their 
lives in North Korea. For example, there is the South Korean TV program titled "이제 만나러 갑니다[Yi-jae Man-
na-re Gam-ni-da] (Now, I go to meet you)," where North Korean defectors are telling their experiences about 
North Korea. 
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The 1972 Constitution is more sophisticated than the 1948 one, and there are two main 
points for 1972 Constitution (Yoon 1295;1296); First, it manifested the power of Kim, Il-sung as 
absolute and undisputable leader, and second, it removed private ownership, establishing firmly 
the "socialist central economic planning system" (Yoon 1295). From these changes to the 
Constitution, it is clearly shown that North Korea was definitely moving toward a more 
authoritarian governing regime. It didn't improve its human rights situation, with continuation of 
the government's suppressing and controlling North Koreans. The "levels of repression, 
democracy...[and] economic development" are closely related to human rights violation (Poe, 
Tate, and Keith 291). The less democratic, or more authoritarian, a State is, the more it tends to 
repress human rights (Poe, Tate, and Keith 309; 310).   
However, the Constitution also mentioned some positive goals or visions for their 
socialistic system. Specifically, it stated that antagonistic feeling among classes, "exploitations[,] 
and oppression" are all removed in the State, so the State is pursuing a society without classes 
and the society where people can work based on their abilities and get what they needs (Yoon 
1295;1296). However, despite these aspirations, the reality for all but the elite in North Korea  
was that the people were not even paid properly for what they worked to maintain adequate 
standard of their living, and the working conditions were terrible (Demick 60).  
In this situation which is contrary to the goals in the Constitution, North Koreans are 
stuck into their situation of poverty and starvation, their basic rights to life being violated. They 
cannot stop their working let alone resisting against their supervisors for right treatment because 
otherwise, you would not even receive coupons for food, and forced to go to a detention center 
(Demick 60). Furthermore, most children's "weight-for-height" were a lot less in North Korea 
than the international standard from the study conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) 
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(Kotona-Apte and Mokdad 1317). This data show that the nutrition level of North Koreans, 
especially children, is severely lacking to continue healthy life. In this situation, numerous 
people are dying from hunger day to day. When this reality is compared to the Constitution, there 
is a contradiction or inconsistency between the two. Contrary to the Constitution that says that 
the State pursues the society where all people get what they need, the North Korean people have 
been continuously exploited without adequate pay and working condition, and oppressed by the 
government which disallows criticism against the State. The people have not even been able to 
get fed enough to ensure their survival. In this context, the people's basic right to life, which is 
clearly articulated in the Article 3 of UDHR, has been being violated. 
At the same time, however, the  objectives and some descriptions about the way the State 
elect its president that are stated in the Constitution can be used by the international community, 
to hold the State accountable for not following even its own words. The objectives include 
elimination of class antagonism, oppression, and exploitation, which is mentioned above. 
Additionally, the North Korean Constitution says that for government organizations, officials are 
elected by its people (Yoon 1296). By putting these statements in the Constitution, North Korea 
is expected to follow their words and to apply the principles to serve its own people, which the 
State doesn't seem to try to do. The Constitution guarantees that the State is "representing the 
interests of all the Korean people" (Yoon 1296). However, the situations of starvation and 
oppression, mentioned above, clearly demonstrates that the people's interests cannot even be 
expressed, let alone being represented. In this situation, the Constitution should be used by the  
international community as another 'tool' to accuse North Korea of human rights violation and 
for leverage to improve its human rights protection. 
25 
 
There was another major change in the Constitution in 1992, mainly influenced by the 
global trend and several external incidents at the end of Cold War, when "the geopolitical world 
order" was changing with the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist countries (Yoon 
1297). In addition, China was also transforming its economic system toward the market system 
(Yoon 1297). In this situation, with the previous communist connections being almost gone, 
North Korea became isolated, and forced to build new relations for investment and trade, to 
improve its political and economic situation(Yoon 1298). The State changed the Constitution 
accordingly (Yoon 1298). The 1992 Constitution showed that North Korea was definitely 
concerned about global trends and the views of international community. These reforms counter 
the conventional assumption that North Korea is ignoring the surrounding international 
community entirely. 
There are both negative and positive sides to the 1992 reform to cover in this paper about 
human rights situation in the State. On the negative side, North Korea became more concentrated 
with its military protection. The National Defense Commission(NDC) was elevated to be a 
separate organ (Yoon 1299). The Constitution before 1992 gave the President power to lead the 
NDC, but after 1992 the chairman of the NDC had the power to control the NDC directly. 
Specifically, Kim, Jong-il was "elected" to be the chairman during that time as Kim Il-sung tried 
to give foundations for him to be successive leader (Yoon 1289; 1299). This elevation of the 
NDC as a separate organ meant that the leaders' attention and  resources were more outward 
looking, focused on national security, while the people continued to starve to death on the 
ground. In that sense, this change might have worsened the poverty and hunger situation of the 
people through lack of food distribution to them. The public distribution system for food was 
"far below the daily requirement" in 1997 (Katona-Apte and Mokdad 115). 
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On the other hand, there were some positive changes in the 1992 Constitution. First, the 
State developed a democratic system at least on the surface level. For example, "the proletarian 
dictatorship" was changed into a "dictatorship of people's democracy" (Yoon 1298). This reform 
suggested the appearance of democracy in that the State included "democratic" in the name of 
their system to cope with the situation where the State became isolated in the world (Yoon 1298).  
Secondly, through the 1992 reform, North Korea opened its door to more countries 
including South Korea to get foreign investments and to develop its economy. Specifically, the 
North Korean government's attitude and policies became more about co-existence rather than 
antagonism in relation to South Korea (Yoon 1299). Moreover, the State established "Rajin-
Sonbong Free Economic Trade Zone," and Pyongyang passed laws related to foreign investment 
(Yoon 1300). These steps suggest that North Korea was responding to international community 
by opening up its door to improve its political and economic situation. Also, it shows that North 
Korea seems to care about the diplomatic relations with other countries, and it actually tried to 
make more positive relations with other countries, at least in the era. 
                B. Criminal Law Reforms 
This paper will now discuss the changes in North Korea's criminal law to see whether 
there have been any further impacts by the international community on North Korea's human 
rights practices. There have been five revisions of the criminal law since 1950 when it was first 
enacted, but the most significant revision occurred in 2004 (Han 122). In general, the revision of 
the criminal law showed some progressions, especially in terms of human rights protections (Han 
122; 123). Specifically, for the revision in 2004, there are two major reforms, definition of 
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crimes and punishment levels. Both of these are closely connected to international pressure on 
North Korea to promote its human rights situation.  
Before going into the details about the two main criminal law reforms, this paper will 
introduce brief background information about the context of the revisions in 2004. Since the mid 
1990s, there has been an economic crisis in North Korea, resulting from the breakdown of its 
socialist "brother" countries and "the failure of a self reliant economy" (Han 126). Confronted 
with those economic failures and crises, North Korea focused more on "controlling abuse of 
commercial discretion" rather than exercising omnipotent power (Han 127). The State tried to 
punish those who are violating economic regulations, especially in the area of foreign trade, by 
making them do labor training to facilitate economic activities (Han 126; 127). Through the "less 
than two years' labor training," the State tries to make sure not only that state monopolies are 
protected but also that economic activities, especially foreign investment, flow without any 
disturbance (Han 127). In that sense, North Korea showed willingness to improve its economic 
structure, at least in its appearance from international community. Under the spiral model, this 
change of the criminal law in 2004 might be tactical in that it tries to get foreign investment 
according to Sup Han. However, in itself, it showed that North Korea cares about its relations 
with  the international community, and the State is following the phases in the spiral model of 
human rights compliance. 
In this context, there are two big areas that North Korea changed or revised, pressured by 
or being conscious of the international community: 1) definition of crimes and 2) level of 
punishment. First, when it comes to the definition of crimes, the revision in 2004 adopted the 
principle of "nullum crimen sine lege," which means the offenses that are specified in the law are 
the only ones that are considered crime by the State (Han 124). Before the revision, North Korea 
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had adopted the use of "analogy" to its criminal law, which means that even offenses that are not 
specified in the laws can be considered crimes resulting in the application of those laws that are 
described as "most similar crimes in its types and gravity of danger" (Han 124). There is a 
danger in this "analogy" in that the criteria of telling what is crime and what is not could become 
subjective, and the North Korean people would be unclear about the specific criteria of crime and 
insecure about their safety. However, by revising the criminal law from the principle of 
"analogy" to "nullum crimen sine lege," the criteria for defining crime becomes much more 
straightforward, and it makes people safer from arbitrary prosecution in that the offenses that are 
only written specifically in the criminal law will be  considered as crimes. Moreover, the 
principle of "nulum crimen" is a widely accepted legal principle (Han 125). Based on all these 
information, the change of the criminal law in defining crime shows that North Korea actually 
took an action that is consistent with internationally universal norms. Also, the principle of 
"nullum crimen sine lege" which the State adopted helps establish the consistent application of 
laws, preventing the unfair treatment of people who didn't commit offenses specified in the 
criminal law. This change promotes the human rights protection of more people, especially right 
to security from the Article 3 in the UDHR.  
The second criminal justice reform that aligns with human rights protection is related to 
punishment. Punishments, in general, have become more lenient in each of the previous five 
reforms of the criminal code. Punishment for many crimes in North Korea's criminal law 
traditionally involved the death penalty and "correctional labor," which is "the imprisonment 
with forced labor" (Han 125). In the past few decades, however, there have been two major 
positive changes in punishment: 1) the changes since 1987 and 2) the change in 2004. Since 
1987, the imposition of the death penalty has been reduced, and it is now applicable for only five 
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categories of offenses, including "anti state offenses" and "murder offenses" (Han 125). It shows 
that the punishment became lenient, except for certain crimes like anti state offenses and murder 
offenses. Through these limits on the use of the death penalty, human rights become more 
protected, including protection of the right to life, as set forth in the Article 3 of the UDHR.A 
second significant change in punishment is that, in 2004, there was the creation of new forms of 
punishments, including "life imprisonment and labor-training" (Han 125). Labor training, which 
is working in "labor camp, factory, or mine", is the punishment for insignificant offenses without 
imprisonment (Han 125). Currently, labor training is the punishment for most offenses (Han 125; 
126). Life imprisonment is an alternative form of punishment for the "five capital offenses" and 
other significant offenses (Han 125). These changes shows that punishment has become 
generally more lenient in North Korea, improving little by little as the international community 
keeps pressuring the DPRK government on this issue through the actions of the UN, significant 
States, and NGOs.     
In addition to the reforms regarding definitions and punishments,  the scope of the 
category of "anti-state offenses" has been reduced, according to Han (129). This change is also 
closely related to the promotion of the human rights, especially the right to security in that 
people's life style is less limited as the scope of the crime is reduced. For example, compared to 
the law in 1974, the revision of the law in 1987 reduced "the contents of the anti-state offenses" 
and punishment level (Han 127). The Law in 1974 clearly says that the punishment of the "anti-
state offenses" is either death or confiscation of private belongings, but the revision in 1987 
lowered the punishment level to "correctional labor" (Han 127). This change of decreasing the 
scope of the "anti-state crime" and being less harsh about the punishment of the crime is positive 
indications regarding the State's compliance with human rights norms. Specifically, the people's 
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freedom under the Article 2 of the UDHR, would be more protected through less restriction 
imposed by the criminal law.  
Another area that must be considered and studied, however, in relation to the State's 
criminal law is the issue of political prisons. Despite of a number of reports and articles on 
political prisons through international community including Han's "The 2004 Revision of 
Criminal Law in North Korea:-a take-off?," North Korea keeps denying the existence of political 
prison camps. It is hard to get more information about the operation of these camps outside the 
State because their existence is not even written in the criminal law according to Han. However, 
at the same time, North Korean refugees are giving testimonies as witnesses about political 
prisons and said those who shows complaints about the dictatorship are sent to the prisons for 
forced labor and "banishment into a remote inland area" (Han 128; 129). Complaints are 
considered crimes regardless of whether they are just spoken or shown through one's behavior 
(Han 128; 129). In this situation, the area of political prisons should be studied in detail through 
more direct methods of investigation, such as country visits by the UN including Special 
Rapporteur. In these ways, North Korea should be presented with more direct and primary 
evidence of violations in the prisons so that it cannot deny its actions. Moreover, the 
international community should keep pressure upon North Korea about the fact that political 
prison camps are outside the criminal law, the camps are therefore obviously extra-legal, and 
thus violation per se of the human rights of detainees in the camps keep happening. 
2) Policy Changes and Diplomacy In Response to International Pressure 
So far, we have discussed the legal impact of the international community on North 
Korea by looking at the changes in North Korea’s Constitution and criminal laws. As mentioned 
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in Han's article, although the State may be using tactical concession to attract foreign 
investments, "tactical concession" is one of the phases in the spiral model for human rights 
violators, which indicates some level of progress. Moving on from the analysis of legal impact, 
this paper will discuss the North Korean government's response to the demands of the 
international community in other aspects, including its policy changes and diplomatic activities.  
The first significant policy change was North Korea's shift from socialist and self-reliant 
economic to market-oriented policies and its opening of its borders to foreign investment and 
trade. Faced with severe famine during the economic crisis in the mid-1990s along with the 
breakdown of its socialist "brother" States, North Korea introduced market-oriented policies 
through which price, wage, and supplies are adjusted, the market is broadened, and foreign 
investment is accepted (Han 126). These changes, along with efforts to form new relations after 
the breakdown of communist States such as the Soviet Union, show that North Korea cares about 
how the international community perceives the State. To create these post-Cold War relations 
and attract foreign investment, North Korea reformed its laws. According to Han, as mentioned 
above, the government specifically reformed its criminal law so that the level of punishment was 
decreased and the scope of crimes was narrowed.  It also shows that North Korea has been aware 
of the criticism from the international community for its human rights violations and has been 
taking actions to improve its image (at least to seem favorable to its potential trade partners). 
Moreover, it is significant that the State changed its economic policies to be more market-
oriented in order to revive its economy.  These policies are very different from North Korea’s 
original socialist economic policies. In this way, North Korea seems to have started to accept that 
its system is not working for its people, at least economically. The State has also opened up to 
foreign investment from the international community to address this issue.  
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Specifically, there are four main areas that North Korea opened for foreign investment : 1) 
Raseon, 2) Sinuiju, 3) Kaesong, and 4) Geomgangsan (Zook). Raseon is the first area that the 
State opened up to bring foreign investment, but it failed because of "poor institutional design" 
and poor regulation (Zook 165). Even though the area has more freedom compared to other areas 
in the State because it does not directly belong to the State, the trade is still controlled by the 
SPA, which means it is not completely free (Zook 166). Also, the regulations for foreign 
investments are confusing (Zook 166). Accordingly, the law for the second area, Sinuiju, was 
devised to address these drawbacks (Zook 169). Sinuiju is the only area where there is a railroad 
connecting North Korea and China (Zook 169). In addition, the State has the law, called "the 
Basic Law of the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region," that guarantees "the considerable 
degree of autonomy" in its administration to prevent "interference from the central government" 
(Zook 169; 170). Meanwhile, in reality, the area has been also under strict control of the State in 
that all property in the area is considered as the State's (Zook 172). At the same time, however, 
the State made laws in an effort to appear more liberal than strict in their ruling of the province 
(Zook 172). Specifically, it created a law that provides residents of the area with privileges in 
society though it is doubtful that the policy would be effective in bringing more residents to the 
area without social infrastructure (Zook 172). The free-trade related regulations in these two 
areas suggest that North Korea is trying to improve its international image to build foreign 
relations. Also, North Korea is trying to improve its economic situation for its people by opening 
up its economy to other States regardless of ideological difference. Furthermore, using relations 
with North Korea, the international community can better hold the State accountable for its 
human rights violations.  
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North Korea has also opened the city of Kaesong to South Korea as an economic zone, 
where South Koreans can enter and establish factories for North Korean workers. While the 
other cities like Raseon and Sinuiju, which are on the border between North Korea and Russia or 
China, are open mainly for economic investment,  Kaesong, which is near the capital, Pyongyang, 
was opened for both economic and political reasons (Zook 173). It was first opened in 2002 as a 
result of negotiation between its leader, Kim Jong-il, and South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, 
who strongly endorsed the "Sunshine Policy." This policy encouraged more trust and 
cooperation between the two States to make the relations between the two become favorable 
(Zook 174). In that sense, the opening of Kaesong is not only for economic investment but also 
for political cooperation (Zook 174). This example shows that there are opportunities for other 
States to build positive relations with North Korea, through which the State can both increase 
economic efficiency to feed its people and make favorable political connections. From the 
connections, it not only can get more help but also can be subject to positive challenges to 
improve the quality of its people's lives and better protect their human rights. Although North 
Korea recently closed Kaesong industry complex on April in 2013 by withdrawing its workers 
and disallowing South Koreans to enter North Korea because of "military tensions and threats of 
war," the complex was opened again on September in the same year (Wilson).      
Lastly, North Korea also opened Geungangsan, Mt. Geumgang, for South Korean 
tourism (Zook 178).  The State not only opened the place for tourism but also for sales by 
businesses of South Korea, including selling goods to tourists (Zook 178). Hyundai Asan, a 
major South Korean corporation, has been the one participating in this project of tourism in the 
mountain (Zook 179). In the area, South Koreans are only subject to South Korean laws, so they 
don't have to worry about violating North Korean laws (Zook 179). The tourism successfully 
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continued from 1998, when the project officially started, until 2008 when a South Korean 
women was shot and killed by North Korean soldiers. The project, along with Kaesong economic 
zone, has not been operated since then, but is recently in the process of preparation for starting 
again, especially in South Korea, according to Freya Petersen and Geoffrey Cain's "South Korea 
Signals Return to North Korea's Mount Kumgang [Geumgang] Tourist Resort." South Korea has 
been accepting the companies that would like to have businesses in the field of tourism in 
Geumgang mountain (Petersen and Cain). The fact that North Korea opened the Geumgang 
mountain for South Koreans, along with the Gaeseong city, working with the South Korean 
companies shows that the State is willing to work together with its antagonistic party, to improve 
its economies and develop its systems.   
Meanwhile, along with these policy changes including opening up places for trade, 
investment, or tourism, North Korean government also signed international human rights treaties.  
In fact, North Korea ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child on September 21st in 
1990,  the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflicts on September 6th in 2000, and the Convention concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour on 
March 29th in 2001 (University of Minnesota Human Rights Library). The State also acceded to 
12 international human rights treaties including two major human rights, the ICCPR and the 
ICESC on September 14th in 1981 (University of Minnesota Human Rights Library). Here, 
ratifying a treaty means that a State agrees to be bound by it, as a State-party to it, and to be 
monitored by the related treaty committee regarding whether it has incorporated the treaty into 
their laws and policies appropriately. On the other hand, acceding to a treaty means accepting 
"the opportunity to become a party to a treaty", with  "the same legal effect as 
35 
 
ratification"(United Nations Treaty Collection). Moreover, Lee, Kyu-Chang says, "on July 3, 
2013, North Korea signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in his article 
(1). The context of signing the convention was article 8 in the revised Constitution in 2009, 
saying "protects and respects human rights (Lee K1). This ratification status of North Korea 
shows that the State is paying attention to the actions of UN and other human rights 
organizations, and human rights treaties among the States. Most importantly, it is willing to take 
action to become a party to treaties, through which it gets more responsibilities to improve its 
human rights situation, complying with the treaties. 
North Korea started to ratify some of the international human rights treaties in the 1990s, 
when its ally States including the Soviet Union were collapsing. This might suggests that North 
Korea had a big "tactical concession" to look favorable to its potential trade partners at the end of 
the Cold War. Around this time, North Korea  tried to build post-Cold War relations to bring 
foreign investments to strengthen its economy, as mentioned above in p.31. To attract the 
investments, the North Korea changed some laws including criminal laws for better human rights 
protection. Furthermore, it took some diplomatic actions to look more favorable to international 
community for bringing foreign investments from it, and the actions include signing international 
human rights treaties. Since North Korea has already been a member of the United Nations since 
1991, it might have been easier for the State to find the human rights treaties to sign because 
there are some existing conventions and covenants in the UN. The State's signing the treaties 
might not be out of its sincere attitude, but at least it tried to show some favorable actions to 
appeal better to international community as a "tactical concession".      
Through these ratifications, North Korea can be pushed by the treaty committees to 
actually comply with the treaties in reality, not just showing the fact that they ratified. For 
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example, in the recent case where nine teenagers and young adults were repatriated to North 
Korea on May 2013, North Korea can be pushed more to comply with the ICCPR and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which the State is a party to, when it comes to the 
treatment of those refugees (Cho 1;4). Specifically, North Korean government violates the 
freedom of movement for its people including the nine teenagers and young adults, where it can 
be pushed more to stop punishing the nine repatriated people politically, in order to protect their 
rights in the ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Cho 4). Furthermore, they 
need more protection from the threat to their rights for safety because they are still teenagers or 
young adults. Overall, as seen in this case, to make sure that North Korean people are well 
protected under the covenants and conventions the State ratified, international community, 
especially the treaty committee, should keep pushing the State to be consistent with the treaties, 
by monitoring its human rights situation constantly. However, at the same time, to motivate the 
State to cooperate with the international community more to protect the human rights norms for 
its people, and possibly to sign more human rights treaties, the international community should 
also give "carrots" to the State like giving financial support, as a reward for ratifying the treaties. 
 3) Quality of People's Lives in North Korea 
 So far, we have talked about the North Korean government's response to the international 
community, the UN, individual countries, and NGOs, in legal reforms, policy changes, and 
ratification of international human rights treaties as diplomatic actions. Now, this paper will 
move to the third part, which is about the overall quality of people's lives in North Korea, based 
on these changes mentioned above. This third part is different from the previous two parts in that 
it will analyze North Korean human rights situation from a micro-level perspective, actual 
people's lives, while the other two analyzed the situation from the macro-level perspective, laws 
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and politics. Specifically, the overall qualities of the people's lives will be measured in three 
specific aspects: 1) their nutrition and health situation, 2) rights to secure life, and 3) freedom to 
get education and knowledge. 
 When it comes to the nutrition and health situation, there has been no improvement, and 
rather, the situation has gotten worse than before. There is a Public Distribution System in North 
Korea through which food is distributed to the public, and, in 1997
6
, the amount of the food 
distributed per person by the system was "far below the daily requirement"  (Katona-Apte and 
Mokdad 1315). The story of North Korean refugee Joseph Kim is one example of the worsening 
nutrition situation in North Korea. In 1994 when he was a four-year-old child, there was "a great 
famine" in the State and his family was starving to death for nearly a decade, and in 2003, his 
father died due to lack of food (Ted Talks). His family was searching for food in streets, and 
even on his birthday, he could not get any food (Ted Talks). He even felt humiliation and 
hopelessness from a very young age through this starvation. This story shows that even the most 
basic human right, right to food and healthy life, has been denied to North Korean people for 
decades. In addition to this story of a North Korean refugee, there is statistical evidence that 
shows severely poor nutrition and health conditions in North Korea compared to the international 
standard, which will be discussed in the following paragraph. 
 Specifically, in 1997, the World Food Programme measured the growth of children in 
"government-selected institutions," and it showed severe lack of nutrition and health condition, 
especially among children (Katona-Apte and Mokdad). The investigation was only possible in 
"certain parts of the country" for children under 7 years of age (Katona-Apte and Mokdad 1315). 
This suggests that the government might have selected institutions with the best conditions in the 
                                                          
6
  The author admits that it is a little dated, but more recent information was impossible to obtain.  
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country in order to show the public health and nutrition situation to be as positive as possible. 
Despite that, the result of the measurement shows that most North Korean children "were below 
the normal weight-for-height" and normal height-for-age as well, compared to international 
standard (Katona-Apte and Mokdad  1317).  A few institutions "with a prevalence of wasting [or 
severe malnutrition] < 10%" had higher probability to provide more food and snack, but the 
overall condition in institutions was too poor for children to be treated well for their better 
health(Katona-Apte and Mokdad 1317). Many institutions had too many children with too few 
staff, even up to 20 children per one staff (Katona-Apte and Mokdad 1317). In addition, no 
relationship was shown between "the rates of acute malnutrition," and "the number of teachers, 
staffs" and food in an organization (Katona-Apte and Mokdad 1317). This means that no 
appropriate action was taken by the government in the situation of severe malnutrition.  
 This situation shows that North Korea has failed to comply with the Convention on 
Rights of Child, which the State ratified in 1990, and ICESCR, which was acceded to in 1981. 
The Convention on Rights of Child clearly says, "State Parties undertake to ensure the child such 
protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being." Based on the ratification of the 
treaty and ICESCR, North Korea has an obligation to do their best and use their resources to 
protect the children's well-being, which includes good nutrition. However, the reality of North 
Korea is that even basic human rights like the right to food and right to life are being violated, 
and there seems to be no improvement.  
 In addition, when it comes to working condition for the teachers and staffs in the 
institutions (kindergartens and nurseries), North Korea has failed to comply with the reformed 
Constitution in 1972, which required the elimination of exploitation. In reality, teachers and staff 
are unfairly exploited with too many children assigned per person. It is closely related to harming 
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people's health because maintaining good health is harder in a situation of overwork and fatigue 
resulting from a heavy workload. Thus, the people's rights to life have been threatened in this 
adverse health condition.  
 These examples of human rights violation show that, with regard to several rights, North 
Korea is still in the repression stage in the 'spiral model', which is the model of how human rights 
perpetrators come to follow international human rights laws in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink's book, 
mentioned above. North Korean people's right to food and right to healthy life, especially the 
children's , are repressed by the government in that it is not taking any immediate actions to 
improve their living condition, even though it has responsibility, as a sovereign nation, to protect 
its own people. 
 Moreover, when it comes to their right to a secure life, North Koreans are still under 
constant threat due to the dictatorial nature of the regime. North Korean citizens are threatened 
due to the existence of concentration camps and the punishment of repatriated refugees, which 
have been reported constantly by NGOs and States' reports including the U.S. Congress's and 
South Korea's white papers.  First, according to the report on North Korean human rights issue 
by the U.S. Congress in 2007, there are several concentration camps in North Korea where 
150,000-200,000 people are incarcerated (8). The refugees who have managed to escape from 
the camps testify that those who are sent to the camps include political prisoners, and the 
conditions of the camps are too severe for them to survive (Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, and 
Bruno 8). These concentration camps' existence, which is shown through many testimonies, is 
threatening the people's security of life. According to the UN Special Rapporteur, many human 
rights violations, including the violation of "security of the persons," have been constantly 
reported about North Korea even though there have been some legal improvements related to 
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human rights protection (Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, and Bruno 8).  In addition, the North 
Korean government is not responding to several cooperation requests from the UN Special 
Rapporteur (Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, and Bruno 9). In that sense, North Korea's position in 
the 'spiral model' also fits into the 'denial' stage, where the country doesn't accept or ignores 
criticism and accusations of its human rights violations from international community, especially 
about the concentration camps. 
 In addition to being threatened by the possibility of detention in concentration camps, the 
security of life is also violated by how repatriated North Koreans are treated by the State. The 
1987 North Korean penal code says that defection is "a capital crime," and repatriated people are 
sent to "a reform institution", and can even be sentenced to the death penalty if they are found to 
have committed a crime of "grave concern", the meaning of which is not clearly defined 
(Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, and Bruno 9). The U.S. Congress report of 2007 shows that 
repatriated North Koreans are forced to suffer severe punishments like "detention, torture, 
placement in concentration camps, forced labor, and even execution (10). Furthermore, among 
the repatriated North Koreans, pregnant women whose children are fathered by Chinese men are 
forced to have abortions (Margesson, Chanlett-Avery, and Bruno 10). All of the repatriated 
people eventually get death punishment, including public execution, according to the testimonies 
from many North Korean refugees. For example, Hyeonseo Lee, who escaped North Korea in 
1997, and is currently living in South Korea, said, "I thought my life was over" when she was 
interrogated by Chinese police to see whether she was North Korean, who are repatriated back to 
their State ("Ted Talks-Hyeonseo Lee"). She also mentioned that numerous people who are 
repatriated to North Korea face torture, imprisonment, or public execution ("Ted Talks-
Hyeonseo Lee"). In this situation, where the lives of people are taken by the government just 
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because of crossing the border due to inhumane living conditions in North Korea, the people 
cannot enjoy the security of life at all. Even for those who have not escaped North Korea, the 
right to the security of life is not fully protected as they are watching the repatriated people 
publicly executed. The terror instilled by the threat of public execution results in denial of the 
right to a secure life of people who are watching them publicly killed.  
The freedom to get an education is not fully protected for North Koreans as well. The 
right to education is clearly set forth in the article 26 of the UDHR and article 13 of the ICESCR, 
as the right for all people (KINU 363). However, the right to education through formal institution 
and curriculum, especially for children, doesn't seem to be protected in North Korea. Though the 
education from kindergartens to middle schools is mandatory in North Korea, some of the 
schools don't seem to be properly operated because of the economic struggle that the State is 
going through (KINU 363; 364). Specifically, the State has been going through serious poverty 
since 1990s.   
Furthermore, North Korea excludes some people from education; specifically, the 
government doesn't give educational service to political criminals' children and those who might 
be reactionary (KINU 364). Moreover, though a college entrance exam system was established 
by the government for giving high school students more chance to connect to college from high 
school, there are unfair advantages to those with certain "family background and Party 
Affiliation" for the admission to colleges (KINU 366). It violates the State's own Constitution, 
where the elimination of class antagonism is stated during the revision in 1972. This is because 
giving unfair advantage to persons from certain family backgrounds, which is closely related to 
class, would create some hostilities or even conflicts between classes. In addition, military 
education is mandatory for children, and the international community such as the UN has been 
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concerned about this because that kind of education might have a bad influence to the growing 
children not only physically but also emotionally (KINU 372). For example, the Committee on 
the Rights of Child in the UN has given the North Korean government two recommendations and 
concerns on military education for children (KINU 372). In addition, the UN Committee was 
worried that the mandatory military education also has "a negative impact  on the purpose of 
education" in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (KINU 372). Article 29 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child says that the purposes of education include "the 
development of respect for human rights" and "the preparation of the child for responsible life in 
a free society, in the spirit of...peace," which cannot be fully protected in North Korea due to 
mandatory military education for children (KINU 372; OHCHR).   
When it comes to the right to an education and to seeking knowledge independently from 
the curriculum the government imposes, North Koreans are strictly prohibited from learning 
anything outside the prescribed materials, especially regarding facts about foreign countries. 
They are not even allowed to watch any foreign films or dramas, otherwise, they are severely 
punished for it, and could even be killed in public. For example, approximately 80 people were 
publicly executed in the beginning of the November in 2013, most of whom are executed due to 
watching South Korean and other countries' dramas (AFP). Through the State-controlled media 
and specific curriculum made by the State, North Koreans are said to be taught to be "the 
cleanest, most civilized people" in the world (Myers 165). By being continuously "taught" that 
way, the people are not even allowed to have doubts against their regime and are forced to praise 
the leaders and the regime for their survival. For example, Hyeonseo Lee, one of the North 
Korean refugees living in South Korea, said, "I thought my country[North Korea] was the best 
on the planet" ("Ted Talks"). She also mentioned she was very proud about North Korea, singing 
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the song 'Nothing to envy,' and she didn't get any more education about foreign countries than 
being just "educated" to see the U.S, South Korea, and Japan as the enemy ("Ted Talks"). In this 
situation, as the State tries to maintain the regime without any opposition, the rights of North 
Koreans to receive education or ideas that can be distinguished from political propaganda, 
especially about the facts outside their country, are being violated. In addition, the phrase, "the 
cleanest, most civilized people" taught by the State violates the article 13 of the ICESCR, which 
North Korea accessed in 1981. The article 13 emphasizes that an education should "promote 
understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations," which is clearly inconsistent with 
North Korea's teaching as their people to be "most civilized" and to see some countries as the 
enemy.      
An Evaluation under the Spiral Model 
This evidence shows that the North Korean government's actions cover three different 
phases in the spiral model: “repression,” “denial,” and “tactical concession.” When it comes to 
overall quality of people's lives, the nutrition and the health condition of North Korean people is 
getting worse, the right to healthy living being violated, especially for children. Also, North 
Koreans' rights to secure life are violated by its government as shown by the existence of 
concentration camps and the treatment of repatriated people. Moreover, for their rights to get 
education and get knowledge, North Koreans don't seem to get appropriate education even from 
their national institutions, let alone getting the knowledge about the world outside the State.  
Through patterns of human rights violations that continue to violate the rights of the people 
living in North Korea, it is shown that the DPRK government is in the "repression" phase in the 
spiral model. North Korea is still repressing and suppressing its people's basic human rights, 
especially the right to food, without taking any appropriate action in this situation. At other times, 
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the State is also in the "denial" phase in that it is denying the existence of concentration camps 
despite numerous reports from North Korean refugees.  
Moving from micro-level analysis of  North Korea’s human rights situation to macro-
level, North Korea is also in the "tactical concession" stage, as shown in the legal reforms and in 
the government responses to the  international community, such as the State’s changing of 
policies and signing of international human rights treaties. Specifically, North Korea is trying to 
show how it complies with human rights norms, at least from the legal documents themselves. 
For example, it wrote about elimination of class antagonism or exploitation and about democratic 
system of election in its Constitution and became more lenient in the punishment level of crimes, 
with clearer definition of crimes in its criminal laws. Meanwhile, North Korea changed its 
economic policies to market-oriented policies, which most States adopted, to improve its 
economic situation to get out of poverty and starving of its people. It opened its door to foreign 
investment in several regions, and for this, the State tried to raise its image to international 
community by establishing liberal policies in specific regions for its people. Moreover, it ratified 
or acceded  to several international human rights treaties including the ICCPR,  the ICESCR, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. Even though the human rights norms in the treaties are not fully protected by the 
State, it opened itself up to more monitoring and accountability for the violation of the rights 
mentioned  in them, when it became a State party to the treaties. These legal reforms, policy 
changes and diplomatic actions of signing treaties shows that North Korea has also entered the 
tactical concession phase in that it tries to look as if it was complying to human rights norms to 
the international community to maintain the relations with other countries and get foreign 
investments from them. In that sense, it is hopeful that North Korea seems to follow the spiral 
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model for human rights protection, and it is not completely isolated, as it tries to maintain 
relations, especially for purposes of trade. Most importantly, the international community's 
pressure is one of the motivations for North Korea to take actions on its human rights situation 
when it comes to these legal and political changes made by the government to appear as if it was 
complying with international human rights norms. Because of the constant accusation and 
critiques from international community about human rights violation to North Korea, North 
Korea feels more pressure to improve its human rights situation, at least at the surface level, 
being conscious of its international image and building relations with other countries.    
Conclusion 
Overall, the legal reforms, policy changes, and diplomatic actions show that North Korea 
is actually responding to international human rights laws, global trends, and the international 
community's critiques and accusations about its human rights violations. North Korea is making 
"tactical concessions" to maintain relations with other States. Being conscious of the pressure of 
the international community to improve its human rights situation, North Korea has changed its 
laws, especially the criminal law and sentencing policies, and changed its economic policies by 
adopting more market-oriented ones, which most of States also adopted, to improve its severe 
economic struggles including poverty of the people. In addition, it has become a State Party to  
many international human rights treaties including the two primary human rights Covenants, the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR. This situation is hopeful in that it shows some positive steps by the  
North Korean government toward better human rights protection, at least at the superficial level, 
representing the "tactical concession" phase of the spiral model. 
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Despite these reforms, North Korea still has a long way to go to completely get out of the 
"repression" and "denial" phases of the spiral model. Specifically in the area of nutrition and 
health, the area of right to a secure life, and the area of right to education, North Koreans are 
denied enjoyment of those basic rights in their lives, and there is no improvement according to 
many reports from UN, individual States like South Korea and the U.S. and NGOs, and 
testimonies from North Korea refugees. In this situation, the international community should 
take on more responsibility to protect the North Korean people on the ground through more 
investigations and constant pressure on North Korean government to apply its legal, political, 
and diplomatic actions of signing human rights treaties to people's lives to actually achieve better 
human rights protection in the State. Chief Oren Lyons, who has been working for international 
indigenous rights, said, “Although we are in different boats you in your boat and we in our canoe 
we share the same river of life.” Because of this connection everyone shares in this world as his 
quote shows, the international society has the responsibility to protect North Korean people’s 
human rights. 
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